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Master of Philosophy 
 
 
This thesis provides an empirical investigation on how different public listing locations affect 
the CEO (chief executive officer)’s pay of Chinese SOEs (State Owned Enterprises) and whether 
such a  pay differential would in turn affect the listing location choice by those firms, which 
have not received much attention in the current literature. In particular, we focus on two stock 
markets, the mainland (including Shenzhen and Shanghai) A-share market and Hong Kong H-
share market. Unlike what have been found in many other markets,  where firms listed in the 
foreign markets can normally enjoy a price premium, Chinese firms listed in the Hong Kong 
market (H-share) usually face a discount in prices comparing to what they can get in the 
domestic stock markets (A-share).  So it is a real puzzle why they are eager to be listed in Hong 
Kong.  Explanations have been sought in the past regarding to access to international capital 
markets and reputation or image effects for the Chinese firms.  Our study contributes to the 
current oversea-listing literature by examining CEOs’ personal factors that affect listing location 
choice of SOEs in China. In this thesis, we aim to examine the association between CEO’s pay 
and different listing locations. Our sample covers all the Chinese listed SOEs in both A-share 
and H-share over the period of 1990-2009. First, we examined the effect of different listing 
locations on CEO’s pay and found that a positive CEO’s pay differential exists for H-share 
listing other things being equal, which means a wage premium for H-share CEOs. Furthermore, 
our evidences also support the hypothesis that such a wage premium does provide an incentive 
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Enterprises not only choose where to sell products and services, but also decide where to 
raise funds to finance themselves. Listing location seems to be a big issue for enterprises 
to concern about. In recent studies, more attention has been paid to the issue of firm’s 
foreign listing, which included the location choice and the effect due to different 
locations.  
Sarkissian et al. (2010) argue that a valuation premium that non-U.S. firms achieved 
through listing on U.S. equity markets is not unique. They observed first the U.S. firms 
listed on non-U.S. exchanges and then firms from several other countries experienced 
the foreign listing premium. After examining the foreign listing premium across a broad 
set of home and host markets, they found that not only the U.S. firms listed abroad get a 
value premium but also  the non-U.S. firms do and in  many other foreign  markets, too. 
Doidge et al. (2001) focused on firm’s cross-listings. In their study, they found that 
cross-listed firms have higher valuation than other firms from their country that do not 
cross-list. However, the work did not tackle the potential self-selection issue. They 
pointed out that self-selection does not work in their conclusion due possibly to the 
limitation of the modeling framework or their belief that selection itself does not affect 
the results. They mentioned that further research may help in resolving this issue by 
modeling the listing decision as well. 
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For emerging market firms, Lins et al. (2005) pointed out that issuing equity on U.S. 
stock exchanges could help those firms get a greater access to international capital 
markets. They also explicitly considered the location choice for listing. Richter’s study 
(2009) investigated the role domestic firm-level political connections plays in 
determining a firm’s propensity to cross-list securities in equity markets outside their 
traditional home country. He has reached the following conclusion. The weaker the 
domestic institutional environment is, the less likely the average firm is to cross-list. 
While for connected firms, the weaker the domestic property rights institutions are the 
more likely they are to cross-list. 
Similarly, there are several papers examining the oversea-listing of Chinese firms as 
more and more Chinese firms choose to list overseas in recent years. In a HKIMR 
working paper, Liu (2011) tests the effects of public listing on the performance of banks 
in China, which contain the different effects of public listing locations in particular.  
Tobin et al. (2008) show that international listing can mitigate many of the constraints 
on best practice of China’s state banking sector by not only imposing a more consistent 
set of rules, but also providing the incentives for convergence.  
Specially, previous and recent researches are keen to find out the factors that lie behind 
the Chinese firms’ location choice for oversea-listing. They find that cross-listing of 
Chinese SOEs (State Owned Enterprises, which are the enterprises controlled by central 
government or local governments) is mainly politically motivated as the politically 
connected firms are more likely to list oversea. For example, Hung et al. (2010) find that 
the connected firms’ managers list their firms overseas for private benefits even though 
the connected firms’ post-overseas listing performance is worse than non-connected 
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firms. The investigation covers Chinese SOEs listed in four overseas stock markets, 
including Hong Kong, Singapore, the UK and the U.S. Lin et al. (2010) consider 
political connection in their study as well. In that paper, they use a broader data set to 
investigate the overseas IPO location choice of Chinese firms with the following two 
characteristics: (1) the data contain both cross-listed firms and firms just listed abroad; 
(2) the sample also includes indirect listings which are lack in Hung’s study. 
The objective of our study is to investigate how different public listing locations affect 
the CEO’s pay of Chinese SOEs and whether such a pay differential would in turn affect 
the listing location choice by those firms. Our study contributes to the literature of 
oversea-listing, as recently it has not been paid much attention to that the effect on 
CEO’s pay due to different listing locations also the effect of pay differentials on 
location choice.  
My study extends Lin et al.’s study by adding CEO’s pay differentials as an endogenous 
variable to explain IPO location choice. As in Lin et al.’s paper, it mentioned that SOEs 
and firms with direct listings are more likely to choose Hong Kong, so we concentrated 
on two markets in our study, mainland A-share market and Hong Kong H-share market. 
From the two figures 1 and 2 as shown, it is clear that although the number of Chinese 
firms listed in H-share market appears to be stable since 1990, the scale of oversea-
listing is increasing since 2004, which represented a threefold increase in scale than the 
previous year. But the climbing trend goes down sharply after 2006, and then rebounds 
slowly since 2008. In contrast to A-share market, either listing number or listing scale of 
H-share is smaller than that of A-share. It is possible due to the stricter requirement 
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imposed by Hong Kong stock exchanges. However, from Figure 2, we could easily 
conclude that the Chinese enterprises are eager to list abroad as the growing market 
occupation proved this phenomenon. It is well known that the mainland stock market 
holds the much higher P/E ratio than that in Hong Kong stock market. Under such 
market situation, that the Chinese enterprises are still eager to list abroad seems to be big 
puzzle in the Chinese stock market. Why Chinese firms aspire to list abroad, especially 
for SOEs? 
In China, there exists a special case. Usually, a CEO of SOEs is a government official or 
used to work for government. Especially for a firm controlled by central government, 
which we called SOECG (Firth, 2005) in short in the following sections, the CEO is 
dominated or appointed by the central government. Mostly, they are strongly connected 
with the government. Nevertheless, there is a heavy restriction on government official’s 
pay, so if a typical CEO with a stronger connection with the government, his pay 
compensation may be more concerned about by the public, which means that the amount 
of pay is under a forceful supervision within mainland environment. For another part, 
there may exist such a situation, the supervision would become weaker if the CEO 
entered into Hong Kong’s environment. Because of the different setting of 
compensation, or the different standard level for pay, the CEO could have an excuse to 
raise his annual pay with not so much limitation within the Hong Kong system. As a 
positive pay differential is supposed, CEOs would desire to self-select into Hong Kong 
market if it were available, in order to meet their expectation for higher compensation. A 
greater pay differential according to different listing locations would be the motivation 
for CEOs to devote for H-share approval.  
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As self-selection is taken as endogeneity, so we use the Heckman selection model to 
control for it, which is widely used in the labor economy literature when concerning 
about union/non-union workers wage differentials. Still, other variables have been 
concerned about when modeling the procedure about forming a decision to choose 
where to list, domestic or overseas. Following the previous study in location choice for 
listing, we include several variables into our location determining model, such as 
political connection, firm’s size, listing offer amount, cost rate and other control 
variables. 
In summary, we test the effect of different location on CEO’s pay and found that a 
positive CEO’s pay differential exists, which means a wage premium of CEO in H-share 
SOEs. Then we use the predicted wage premium to find out whether it would in turn 
point out a straight direction to the Hong Kong stock market, as what we want to prove. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the initial public listings 
(IPOs) of Chinese enterprises. It describes the listing situation in mainland A-share 
exchanges and Hong Kong H-share exchanges and reports the cross-listing of Chinese 
firms as well. Section 3 review the current literature related to oversea-listings and the 
CEO compensation literature. In section 4, we point out the theoretical background of 
our model and raise several hypothesis related to our study. Section 5 explains the 
research method using Heckman two-step selection as a widely accepted model to 
control the endogeneity. Also in this section we present our unique empirical sample. 
Consequently, we perform the test on relationship between different listing locations and 
pay differentials in section 6. Nevertheless, we analyze the empirical results based on 




2. REVIEW OF THE PUBLIC LISTINGS OF 
CHINESE ENTERPRISES 
 
Following the economic reforms and the privatization over the last 30 years, China’s 
economy experiences a strong growth, emerging the stock market and leading to a great 
increase in the number of listed enterprises. The dramatic growth of China’s economy in 
recent years makes China play an important role in the emerging stock market. Specially, 
the rise in IPO events in China can not only be measured by the number of listings, but 
also the offering size, the listing methods, no matter direct or indirect, the range of 
industries involved and the choices of listing locations.  
As Du et al. (2007) show that, in China’s state-dominated financial system, a stock 
market listing is a channel to help SOEs raise external financing. Many enterprises, 
especially non-state-owned or private firms, face serious restrictions in gaining access to 
equity markets. So in this section, we overviewed the phenomenon of IPOs for Chinese 
enterprises in both mainland stock market and Hong Kong stock market. As concern to 
the direct listing, we observed the A-share market and H-share market. Furthermore, we 
divide SOEs into two distinct channels: SOECGs and SOELGs. The SOECGs are firms 
controlled by central government and the SOELGs are firms controlled by local 






2.1 IPOS OF CHINESE ENTERPRISES IN MAINLAND                                                                        
Figure 3 and 4 show the entire pictures of IPO listings in mainland A-share market, 
describing the composition of IPO listing number and the composition of total offer 
amount since 1990 until now, at the end of June 2011, respectively.  Especially, the 
SOEs are with breakdowns for different types. 
From Figure 3, in general, before 2004, the Chinese SOEs occupy nearly 70% of the 
total number of IPOs in mainland A-share market except a bottom of 25% in 1991, 
while after that, the occupation of SOEs experience a drop from 50% in 2005 to less 
than 2% at the end of June 2011.  As the red bars represent the SOELGs proportion, it is 
obvious to find that the SOELGs are the majority source of initial listings in A-share 
market before 2004, which account for almost 50% of the total number. But there is a 
downward trend after 2003, with a drop about nearly 22% during the period of 2004 to 
2010. The blue line seems to be flat within the whole period, which represents the 
listings of SOECGs. It remains at the region of 10% to 20%, except no listing in 1991. 
Figure 4 shows the proportion of SOEs offer amount in mainland market especially for 
the directing listings. The SOEs account for nearly 80% of the total amount of offering 
during the whole period, only occur a great drop of 50% in 2010. Still, SOECGs hold the 
majority proportion of total offering amount in A-share market. However, the SOELGs 
experience two highly declines, while the first occur in 2005 accounted for 18% and the 
second occur in 2010 accounted for 15%. But the situation of SOECGs is different from 
that in the previous figure. Before 2000, SOECGs hold a constant proportion of market 
12 
 
offerings represented for about 20%. From 2000 to 2010, the proportion of SOECGs 
seems to be fluctuated, climbing to a peak in 2002 (57.9%) then decline to a bottom in 
2004 (only 4.8%), while following the first drop it jumps again to achieve the second 
peak (64.2%) after two years but falls down again by 27.3% in 2007, and consequently it 
reaches a third peak increased by 17.3% in 2008 to get 54.2%.  However, it appears 
quite low in both 2009 and 2010, representing for only 3%.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Compared with those two figures, we find that the Chinese SOEs still play the most 
important role in mainland A-share market. It is more interesting that although the 
occupation of SOECGs in number decreased during the period of 2004 to 2009, but its 
occupation in amount remains to be the largest part of total offer amount in the same 
period.                                                                                                                                                
As shown below in the appendix, Figure 5 and 6 specifically describe the situation of 
SOECGs and SOELGs in A-share market respectively. In both figures, the blue bar 
stands for the number of IPOs and the red line stands for the offer amount of listing. 
Compared to SOELGs, the SOECGs have both less number and offer amount in general. 
Specially, even when the financial crisis happened in the late 2008, the SOELGs still 
raised their offering in the following year but decrease offering in 2010. Such 
phenomena seem to be not obeyed to the market rule or could be explained as that the 







2.2 IPOS OF CHINESE ENTERPRISES IN HONG KONG 
Similarly, Figure 7 and 8 show the entire situation of Chinese firms’ direct listing in 
Hong Kong H-share market, describing in both the composition of total number and the 
composition of total offer amount respectively.  
In Figure 7, we find that in four special years SOEs account for the total oversea-listing 
number in the whole H-share market, in which are 1994, 1998, 2007 and 2008. Year 
1995 appears to be a special year for Hong Kong stock market, as there are no Chinese 
firms listed there, either the SOEs or the private companies. Maybe the situation like this 
could be explained as in that year, the Chinese central government started the 
privatization process of SOEs, which weaken the attraction of Hong Kong stock market 
as domestic market seems to be more attractive. While the SOEs also suffer three bottom 
point during the whole period of 1994 to 2011, which the lowest occurred in the year 
2002 and the following year 2003 representing for 33.37% and the last bottom point 
appeared in the year 2009 representing for 66.7%. The proportion of SOECGs in IPO 
numbers fluctuated in H-share stock market, also the SOELGs, where the SOECGs have 
the peak point of 66.7% twice, jump to reach almost 50% three times and go down to the 
bottom (0%) also three times. For the SOELGs, more fluctuated than that of A-share 
market but the average level of the proportion is much lower than that of A-share 
market, as its mean value is around 44% in Hong Kong stock market compared to 55% 
in mainland stock market. 
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Figure 8 describes the whole picture about composition of Chinese firms listing amount 
in Hong Kong stock market, as it were quite different from that in mainland stock 
market. As a whole, in two thirds of the period as shown, the SOEs cover nearly all the 
offering amount through IPOs, except in year 1995 as no Chinese firms listed in H-
share. And in the rest period, the SOEs still act as an important part for the oversea 
market, with around 64% proportion in 2004 and 2009 while around 32% proportion in 
2003 and 2010. Similarly, the SOECGs do practice the same trend as SOEs mentioned 
before. But no SOECGs offer H-share in 1998 and 2010 where is different from the 
SOEs as the SOELGs choose to list abroad. Furthermore, it is hard to judge for the trend 
of SOELGs listing through the proportion of offer amount. Because the movement is 
more complicated as it changed frequently. While it has the highest point of 100% and 
the lowest point of 0%, but the gap between the consecutive two years changes from the 
smallest of 4% to the largest of 50% and fluctuated out of order. 
However, the SOECGs and the SOELGs have the same reaction when facing the 
financial crises in late 2008. It is shown in both Figure 7 and 8 that the SOECGs and 
SOELGs decreased either IPO numbers or IPO offering amount in the Hong Kong stock 
market from 2008 to 2009. From 2009 to 2010, the number of SOECGs listing climbed 
up while other indices still remained to fall down. However, all the indices of SOECGs 
and SOELGs began to go up since 2010. In contrast to A-share market, SOEs listed 
oversea are more sensitive to the market environment maybe due to lack of government 
controlled. 
As shown below in appendix, Figure 9 and 10 specific represent the situation of 
SOECGs and SOELGs in H-share market respectively. Apparently, the SOELGs are 
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easy to enter into the Hong Kong stock market to make oversea listing as the number of 
IPOs is much larger than that of SOECGs. However, the situation of total offer amount 
is not alike the situation of listing numbers. Although the SOECGs have an even smaller 
quantity in H-share listing, but they have an extremely greater scale of H-share listing 
when bring the SOELGs into comparison. The greatest scale of SOECGs is about 285 
billion RMB, which is more than six times of the greatest one of SOELGs accounted for 
about 45 billion RMB. What’s more, the average scale of SOECGs is still larger than the 
average one of SOELGs, where 33.6 billion RMB for SOECGs while 11.9 billion RMB 
for SOELGs. 
Looking into the two stock markets, A-share market and H-share market, through all the 
figures shown above, we conclude that Chinese SOEs dominate Hong Kong H-share 
market. Either the IPO numbers or the scale of IPOs for Chinese SOEs began to decline 
since 2009, which indicate that Hong Kong stock market is more attractive for the 
Chinese SOEs in the current and future year. An increase of Chinese SOEs listing will 
certainly spark the H-share stock market and boom the Hong Kong economy. As a 









2.3 CROSS LISTING OF CHINESE ENTERPRISES 
By the end of June, 2011, 69 Chinese firms have been cross-listing in both mainland and 
Hong Kong.  In those firms, 59 are SOEs, which represented nearly 86% of total cross-
listings in China. Specially, the SOEs included 32 SOECGs and 27 SOELGs, which 
show that the majority of cross-listings are SOEs and also signaled that the enterprises 
controlled by central government still have a leading position to list aboard.  
Besides that, almost 64% of the 69 cross-listed firms choose to list in Hong Kong much 
earlier than to list in mainland, which count for 44 as shown on Table 1. And only 7 of 
them are private companies, which seems to be interesting that SOEs prefer to choose 
Hong Kong stock market not domestic stock market. The total number of SOECGs’ H-
share listing following A-share listing and the cross listing at the same financial year is 
similar to their H-share listing before A-share, which represents that the SOECG choose 
Hong Kong as its preferred IPO location when they provided cross listings. While the 
number of SOELGs cross-listing simultaneously is as twice as the number of their A-
share listings at first. In general, no matter SOEs or non-SOEs, they all desire to list in 
Hong Kong stock market as their first choice if it is available. The evidence in total 
supports such conclusion as the joint number of first two columns is almost half of the 
number in last column, with 25 compared to 44. Actually, Hong Kong still remains as 
the most preferred venue for Chinese enterprises’ overseas listing especially for the 




3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 LITERATURE ON THE DETERMINANTS OF OVERSEA-
LISTING 
 
(1) Access to external capital market 
Raising financial funds seems to be the most important reason for firms to list overseas. 
In Lins et al.’s paper (2000), they show that access to external capital markets is 
important for non-U.S. firms listing in the U.S., and especially so for emerging markets 
firms. If a firm is rationed in its access to U.S. exchange market, it may reduce the level 
of information asymmetry and achieve a larger investor base. Then investment liquidity 
will improve and also the firms could raise funds at a lower cost than firms in domestic 
exchange market. 
Consequently, we use the total IPO offer amount and cost rate (IPO cost over annual 
sales) to test whether such expectation will affect a firm’s listing choice. 
 
(2) Regulatory Bonding  
Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999) explained the regulatory bonding theory why 
some firms choose to cross-list, one of the most common explanations for why a firm 
chooses to cross-listing other than its size. Foreign listing benefits from functionally and 
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stricter disclosure requirements could highly protect the investors. Firms can maintain 
greater potential benefits by listing in higher quality contracting institutions. 
Firm size is one of the variables that we use to predict whether a firm prefer to overseas 
listing as we expect that larger firms would be more attractive to investors in foreign 
exchanges and have more capability to bear the stricter requirements. In our model, we 
provide three variables to identify a firm’s size, including registered capital, annual sales 
and employees’ number. 
 
(3) Role of political connection in the overseas listing of Chinese SOEs 
Prior literature suggests that political relations and institutional environments affect 
privatization outcomes (Megginson and Netter, 2001; Gupta, 2005; Fan et al., 2007), it 
provides little evidence on the implication of political connections in the overseas listing 
of SOEs. While in Hung et al.’s paper (2010), they investigate the role of political 
connections in the overseas listing of Chinese SOEs. They point out that firms have 
strong political connections are more likely to list overseas and the managers of 
politically connected Chinese SOEs can extract private benefits from listing overseas. 
The private benefits are described as the recognition in the political media or a 
promotion.  
In our empirical test, we use the political connection as a factor to explain the oversea-
listing choice, but not an instrumental variable to affect a CEO’s benefit on wage. 




3.2 LITERATURE ON CEO COMPENSATION 
 
(1) Definition of CEO compensation 
In the paper of Jiang et al. (2010), there are two flow compensation measures, cash pay 
and total pay. Cash pay is the sum of salary and bonus, whereas total pay is the sum of 
cash pay, stock option grants, restricted stock grants, long-term incentive plan payouts, 
and other annual compensation. In our data sample, the CEOs of Chinese firms rarely 
has equity incentives in compensation, so we define the wage of CEOs in Chinese firms 
as the sum of total pay excluding the equity grants in our study. 
 
(2) CEOs pay determination 
As what Conyon (1997) mentioned, the most consistent and enduring result from myriad 
studies of CEO pay is that firm size is positively and significantly associated with 
compensation levels.  
While agency theory argues that one way to align the interests of managers to the 
interests of shareholders is to make manager’s compensation a function of firm 
performance (Kaplan, 1994; Murphy, 1985, 1999). In Firth’s model (2005), they used 
two measures, one is accounting-based and one is the stock return. Their accounting 
measure of performance is return on sales (ROS) and the other performance measure is 
the annual stock return (RET). 
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In our model, we also use firm size and firm performance to justify the CEOs 
compensation. We use both the number of a firm’s employees and its annual sales to 
proxy for a firm’s size. And still we use both accounting-based measure and stock return 
to calculate a firm’s performance. Our accounting measure of performance includes 
ROA, ROE and profit ratio. The ROA (return on assets) and ROE (the return on equity) 
are not used in Firth’s model as it mentioned by Chen et al. (1998) that those measures 
of profitability suffers from the fact that the values placed on assets are subject to 
management discretion.  However, we only focus on SOEs, so we think the ROA and 
ROE could measure the firm’s performance better as still. And the profit ratio is defined 














4. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND 
HYPOTHESIS 
 
This section discusses the theoretical background with the Heckman Selection model 
and proposes some hypothesis regarding the oversea-listing choice for our empirical 
analysis. In our research, we aim to investigate how different public listing locations 
affect the CEO’s pay of Chinese SOEs and whether such a pay differential would in turn 
affect the listing location choice by those firms.  So our model has been separated into 
two parts.  First, we build a CEO pay model which involves a location dummy to 
determine the pay setting and predict a typical CEO’s pay due to different stock markets. 
Deriving from those predicted pays in A-share market and H-share market, we get a pay 
differential for each observation. Accordingly, we would like to examine the listing 
location decision based on pay differentials and other characteristics as our second part. 
 
4.1 SELF-SELECTION MODEL FOR CEO PAY DIFFERENTIALS 
Consider a CEO’s pay, using a dummy variable to simply pick up the H-share effect in a 
pooled sample of H-share and A-share CEOs is inappropriate since CEOs in H-share 
may self-select and CEOs being in H-share may not be random. Pay differentials due to 
different market status would obtain when self-selection is taken into account. If a CEO 
expected that the standard pay in H-share market is greater than that in A-share market, 
he may choose to list in H-share market because of the pay differential and push the 
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enterprise to achieve H-listing approval. Thus the endogeneity arises as the market status 
is a selection bias in the estimation of CEO’s pay.  
In the literature of labor economy, a conventional Heckman two-step selection model is 
used to obtained union/non-union wage differentials by controlling the potential 
endogeneity of union status. In our empirical studies, the situation about H-share/non-H-
share (A-share) CEO pay differential is quite similar to the situation about union/non-
union wage differential, so we use the Heckman two-step selection model to predict the 
CEOs pay differentials result in self-selection for H-share status. 
In our model, we use the separately estimated A-share and H-share pay equations for 
CEOs as we supposed that a typical market status is endogenous and CEOs self-select 
into H-share/A-share markets. Taking H-share status as an endogenous variable refers to 
the fact that it is potentially a choice variable, the decision to list in H-share or not list in 
H-share is correlated with unobservable that affect CEO’s wage. Supposed that within 
the Hong Kong market CEOs may expect to raise their pay in order to meet the market 
standard level, we use the separately estimated wage equations due to the different 
markets. 
Following the approach, a percentage union-nonunion wage differential with a worker’s 
reservation wage is presumed to determine his union status. If the union wage 
differential exceeds the reservation wage, the worker chooses for a union job, if 
opposite, the worker selects a nonunion job. 
Now, we supposed that if the predicted H-share/non-H-share wage differential is 
positive, CEO selects to list in H-share, otherwise he does not. 
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Let Hi be an H-share status variable, if Hi=1, CEO selects to list in H-share market, 
otherwise he does not. For the ith individual, the H-share/non-H-share status equation is 
defined as: 
(1) Hi=α0+α1Xi+α2Yi+α3 (LnWhi – LnWai) + α4 Zi+ εi 
Where Xi is a vector of personal characteristics; Yi is also a vector of each firm’s 
characteristics; Whi and Wai are H-share and A-share CEO’s pay, respectively; Zi is a 
vector of other explanatory variables to determine the H-share status, and εi is a random 
disturbance term. The term (LnWhi – LnWai) is defined as approximate percentage 
CEO’s pay differential. 
The personal characteristics included in Xi in the equation above are CEO’s political 
connection, CEO’s education level and CEO’s age. The firm’s characteristics included 
in Yi are firm’s nature belongings, firm’s performance measures, firm’s profitability, 
firm’s size and firm’s industry catalogue defined by GICS in Hong Kong as the same in 
mainland. 
The selection model also included the two equations representing the pay determination 
for H-share and A-share CEOs: 
(2) LnWhi = βh0+βh1Xhi+βh2Yhi+εhi  
(3) LnWai = βa0+βa1Xai+βa2Yai+εai  
Equation (2) is the pay equation determined for H-share CEOs while (3) is the pay 
equation determined for A-share CEOs, where Xhi and Xai are vectors of personal 
characteristics for H-share and non-H-share (A-share) CEOs, respectively; Yhi and Yai 
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are vectors of each firm’s characteristics for H-share and non-H-share (A-share) firms, 
respectively; and εhi and εai are random disturbance terms. 
Observed personal characteristics included in Xhi and Xai are CEO’s education level, 
CEO’s professional background and CEO’s age. The observed firm’s characteristics 
included in Yhi and Yai are firm’s nature belongings (SOECG or SOELG), firm’s size 
(annual employees number and sales), firm’s performance measures (ROA, ROE, EPS), 
firm’s profitability (profit ratio which defined as net profit over sales) and firm’s 
industry belongings (separated into 5 industries). 
Using Heckman two-step selection model, where in the first step a probit model is used 
to predict the probability of H-share status and in the second step, the inverse Mill’s 
ratio (IMR) is included as a regresseor. 
 
4.2 HYPOTHESES FOR LISTING LOCATION 
Next, we examine the firm’s listing location choices. In this subsection, we will present 
the main hypotheses regarding the advantages and disadvantages of H-share status for 
Chinese SOEs. 
 
(1) CEOs pay differentials advantage of H-share market 
CEOs pay differentials derived from the Heckman selection model would make a 
positive effect on firm’s H-share listing choice. CEOs under different market conditions 
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may expect to be compensated by different setting levels. Suppose that we could obtain 
a positive pay differential derived from the selection, which means that a pay premium 
of CEOs in H-share SOEs. Such pay premiums will certainly affect listing location 
choice, which incentives CEOs to self-select in H-share market. As a result, expecting 
the pay premium, CEOs are more eager to achieve approval of H-share listing in order to 
meet their self-satisfactions. CEOs pay differentials seem to be a strong motivation for 
firms to list aboard other than domestic stock market. 
 
 (2) Advantage of CEO’s political connection 
As mentioned before, political connection means that the chairman or CEO of the firm is 
a government official, or a member of National People’s Congress or People’s Political 
Consultative Conference, following the definition of Hung et al. (2010).  When a CEO is 
politically connected, it is highly likely that the firm would be much easier to get access 
to the oversea-listing. Also, with a politically connected CEO, the firm is supposed to be 
much easier to get through the barrier of listing aboard compared to the firm without 
such a CEO.  
 
(3) Advantage of SOECGs 
SOEs controlled by central government also have political advantage. Following Lin et 
al. (2010), oversea-listings of the SOEs need to be approved by CSRC and the central 
government in fact plays an important role in deciding where the firms will be listed. 
26 
 
The central government may have its own political objectives and use listings to support 
Hong Kong’s economy. In general, the central government has stronger political 
influences on SOEs compared with the local government. In our study, we enlarge the 
hypothesis that SOECGs usually are supersize enterprises which need much more 
funding raised and also own the strong power to attract foreign investors. In 
consequence, it is much more attraction for SOEs controlled by central government to 
seek oversea-listings. 
 
(4) Cost rate disadvantage of H-share market as compared to A-share market   
The listing costs have recently attracted public attention in Hong Kong, and 
commentators have asked whether the costs of listing in Hong Kong are too high, 
reported by Research & Policy. The typical explicit costs of a Hong Kong IPO include 
underwriting commission, professional services fees, share certificates and fees of the 
registrar and receiving banks in the IPO, publicity costs and exchange fees. We defined 
the cost rate are determined as percentage of cost over annual sales. Within the stricter 
cost rate, it would make a negative effect on firm’s H-share listings. 
 
(5) Other hypotheses 
Also there are other control variables that would influence the SOE’s location choice, 
such as the firm’s profitability, the firm’s size and the firm’s financing needs. Stronger 
profitability would certainly support the firms to decide listing aboard as to attract 
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foreign investors. Higher profit ratio may provide the firms much confidence to ensure 
shareholders benefit even facing higher market risk as listing oversea. Also the firm’s 
size is a factor to affect its location choice. The large scale of size may guarantee firm’s 
stability in a typical market. In another words, the larger the size, the more stable it is, 
which means that it has the ability to face the more challenge appeared in H-share 
market. Furthermore, H-share market could provide the opportunity for firms to meet 
their financing needs and also give them a chance to access to foreign capital market, 
while the A-share market is in shortage. The desire for huge raising funs would incentive 















5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
Following the theoretical model as discussed earlier, we would like to show whether 
there exists any empirical evidence to support our initial hypothesis. In particular, we try 
to predict each CEO’s pay in different markets, both H-share market and A-share 
market, to see if the pays are different for “H-share listing company” and “A-share 
listing company”. Furthermore, it is extremely important that if such pay differentials 
exist it must also influence listing location choice for Chinese SOEs in order to meet 
CEOs self-satisfaction. 
 
5.1 THE DATA 
Until 1998, Chinese listed companies in mainland stock markets were not required to 
disclose executive compensations, which include the remuneration to the board 
directors, supervisors and the senior management in the annual report. We use the exact 
pay for a typical CEO in A-share listing enterprise. The annual reported pay for 
companies listed in A-share market is the total cash compensation but not separated into 
detailed components, while the annual reported pay for companies listed in H-share 
market is broken down into several components, including cash pay and equity 
incentives, whereas the cash pay is the sum of fee, salary, discretionary bonuses, 
allowances, benefits in kind, pension scheme contribution and the equity incentives are 
the total amount of  restricted stock grants and stock appreciation rights.  When we 
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check the cross-listing enterprises whether they have different CEOs in different market, 
we find that such enterprises have the same CEO and the same pay in both markets. 
Meanwhile, we also find that the pay of A-share report is the value of cash pay except 
the equity incentives according to detailed pay components in H-share report. For 
Chinese listed companies, equity compensation is not commonly used and fewer 
companies use the equity incentives for CEO’s compensation in either A-share market 
or H-share market. If they exist, we could only get the real value from H-share annual 
report, but in the A-share annual report, it is not available to value the stock grants and 
option grants from it. To judge the pay equally, we eliminate the equity pay from total 
pay in H-share report as an annul pay for CEOs titled in “H-share market”. For CEOs 
titled in “A-share market”, we use the total pay directly in A-share report as an annual 
pay. Unfortunately the compensation disclosures in Hong Kong stock market have only 
been required since 2005. The earliest data of CEOs pay we could get in H-share market 
is in 2004 as the listed companies are also required to report the executive compensation 
of last accounting year in the annual report. 
Specifically, the IPO total offer amount for a typical SOE we discussed is the amount of 
direct listing on the stock market. Those companies listed through indirect channel, such 
as back door listing and enterprise's mergers and acquisitions, would not be included in 
our sample. Also, the data for listing cost is unavailable before 1993 in A-share market 
and before 1999 in H-share market. Due to the data constraint, we omitted some 
observations in both markets. 
In total, our sample includes 626 listed SOEs in both A-share market and H-share 
market, whereas the number of A-share companies is 593 while the number of H-share 
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companies is 33. The sample data consists of 2211 A-share CEO observations from1998 
to 2009, which covered 85 SOECGs and 507 SOELGs, and 124 H-share CEO 
observations from 2004 to 2009, which covered 11 SOECGs and 23 SOELGs. We 
treated as an unbalance pooled sample. 
We use the Wind Database as our main data source of information for A-share firms’ 
characteristics and performance measures, CEOs characteristics and compensation, and 
the information of H-share firms’ characteristics and performance measures. H-share 
CEOs characteristics and compensation are obtained from the annual reports which are 
collected form the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) website. Furthermore, all the 
SOEs in both markets have been divided into two groups, SOECG and SOELG. We 
search the website of State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
of the State Council to signal the “SOECG” enterprises. 
 
5.2 SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
Figure 11-15 describe the CEOs average pay for firms’ IPO occurred in an assigned 
year. Due to the data constraint, we observe five special years, as the firms listed in 
those years have the data of CEO’s pay pre-IPO and after-IPO. We defined IPO age as 
the number is equal to the report year minus listing year. So we know that if IPO age is 
smaller than zero, which means that the wage represented for the period before IPOs; if 
IPO age is equal to zero, where the wage represented for the listing year’s pay; if IPO 
age is larger than zero, then the wage is the mean level of CEO’s pay after IPOs. What 
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else, the full line show the pay level of A-share companies while the line of dashes show 
the pay level of H-share companies. 
It is obvious to find that a booming on pay when IPO happened no matter the A-share 
companies or the H-share companies. What’s more, it is indicated that CEOs of H-share 
companies experienced an average higher pay level compared to that of A-share 
companies, except in 2007. Such phenomena in deep make us convince our hypothesis, 
pay differentials should occur due to the different listing locations. 
Table 2 shows the entire picture of CEOs average pay in three groups, CEO’s general 
pay, CEO’s pay based on ownership structure and CEO’s pay based on industry 
catalogue. All the groups are separated into A-share market and H-share market. Still, 
CEOs in H-share market gain a higher pay in average through all the three groups, 
which proved our initial hypothesis about pay differentials in statistics analysis. 
 
5.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.3.1 HECKMAN SELECTIVITY MODEL  
In our empirical study, we want to investigate the pay differential between H-share 
CEOs and A-share CEOs. For the purpose of this, we need to separate the CEOs into 
two groups using the location dummy to distinguish “H-share” vs. “A-share” CEOs and 
finally test our theory. 
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In the Heckman selection mode, our main dependent variable is the natural logarithm 
value of yearly pay for CEOs (described as Lnwage below). We converted all the pays 
in accounting year into RMB. The independent variables included as follows: 
(1) SOECG, a dummy variable coded 1 if the SOE is controlled by the central 
government, while if the SOE is controlled by the local government or SOECG, it coded 
0;  
(2) Lnsale and Lnsize, which are defined as the natural logarithm value of annual sales 
and annual number of employees respectively, indicate the firm’s scale and size; 
(3) Firm’s performance measures, our accounting measure of performance is return on 
owners’ equity (ROE) and the measure of stock return is the earning per share (EPS). 
This is following Firth et al. (2005), as he mentioned that in developed nations, 
accounting profit and stock returns are two of the major indicators of a company’s 
financial performance. To use these performance measures in China pre-suppose the 
profit number and stock returns have credibility. And the profit and stock returns do 
reflect economic performance. While in our model, we broadened the measures by 
adding the variables of ROA (return on asset). 
(4) Firm’s profitability, ratio index, defined as profit ratio, which is equal to net profit 
divided by annual sales. The same variable followed as used in Lin et al.’s research 
(2010). 
(5) Potential working experiences, as most of the CEOs completed their postgraduate 
study during the working period, which is treated as a Part-time degree. It is hard to 
judge their working years if we use the method of age minus the year of finishing the 
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highest grade of education and again minus six, so we straightly use the age (accounting 
year-birth year) and its square term to measure the CEO’s potential working experiences 
in an indirect way; 
(6) Education level, we use dummy variable to estimate the highest degree the CEO 
obtained, where degree coded 1 if the CEO obtained a bachelor degree or a postgraduate 
degree, if the CEO’s qualified is sub-degree, then degree coded 0; 
(7) Control variables such as year dummy and industry dummies. Year dummy is equal 
to the exact number of accounting year, while industry controls contain four dummies, 
where Ind1 represents the Information Technology and Energy Industry, Ind2 represents 
the Utilities and Health Care Industry, In3 represents the Raw Materials and Industrial 
Industry, Ind4 represents the Financial Industry and the benchmark choice (omitted) is 
Daily and Non-Daily Consumption Industry. 
Specially, we want to examine whether difference in pay-offs for CEOs result in self-
selection for H-share status. In consequence, we need some variables explained for the 
choice of listing location but not affect pay directly. We believe that CEO’s political 
connection, firm’s profitability and the scale of firm’s raising funds through IPO could 
be explanatory factors to the choice of market status but not necessarily affect the pay 
setting. It is supposed that the CEO’s political connection will provide positive political 
power on getting through the barrier of H-share listings. The last two variables will 
capture the firm’s ability and desire to list aboard. Such three variables further satisfy the 




As mentioned before, our empirical study aims to estimate the impact of “H-share” 
status on CEOs pay differentials between H-share SOEs and A-share SOEs. Firstly, we 
need to run the basic pay equation as follow: 
(4) LnWagei = λ1Xi + εi 
Where the indice i stands for individual. εi is a normally distribution error term with zero 
mean. Xi is a vector of independent variables including all the variables described above 
plus a constant and a location dummy variable. Also we estimate the wage equation 
using the robust estimator to signal each individual by a typical “stock code” in the 
unbalance pooled data. 
Next, if the differences of CEO’s pay for different location status are observable to 
individuals, it is believed that a typical CEO will react to such differences and self-select 
into an “H-share” status if it is available. As a result, observed pay differentials may be 
censored by such a selection. So we need to run Heckman selection model to correct 
such a bias and examine that whether there is a self-selection process for CEOs to obtain 
a wage premium.  
The selectivity model for “H-share” vs. “A-share” status is similar as presented before in 
part 4.1: 
LnWagehi = λh1Xi + εhi  
LnWageai = λa1Xi + εai  
Hi= α (LnWagehi – LnWageai) +ΖiΦ+ ηi       (5) 
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where the subscript h and a stand for “H-share” status and “A-share” status respectively. 
Hi is the location dummy for “H-share” status. Wagehi is observed when Hi=1, while 
Wageai is observed when Hi=0. And εhi ~ N (0, σhi), εai ~ N (0, σai), ηi ~ N (0, 1). 
Ζi contains the four explanatory variables determined the choice of market status and all 
independent variables in Xi , described in equation (4), except for the location dummy 
defined as “H-share” status.  This self-selection model can be estimated simultaneously 
by the full information maximum-likelihood method. A test for selectivity bias “H-
share” status is a test for ρ=0, if ρ<0, it means that the self-selection mechanism exists 
and those CEOs who self-select in H-share status obtain a wage premium. 
 
5.3.2 PROBIT MODEL FOR LOCATION CHOICE  
We would like to test which market status is a SOE’s preferred choice, taking Hong 
Kong H-share market and mainland A-share market for concern. 
We estimate the following probit regression model. Assuming the determined 
component Hhi and random components εhi are separable, the probability of the 
individual i choosing location h can be expressed as: 
Pi = P (Hhi+εhi > Hai+ εai)                            (6) 
where h and a represent for the location choices of H-share market and A-share market. 
We express the index Hhi as: 
Hi = ρ0 DWi + ρ1 Ζi+ εi                                   (7) 
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Where Hi is the location dummy for “H-share” status; DWi is derived from Heckman 
selectivity model, defined as DWi = LnŴagehi – LnŴageai; Ζi contains explanatory 
variables in the selection model plus a constant. Still we use the robust estimator to 


















6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
6.1 LINEAR WAGE EQUATIONS 
Following the estimation approaches presented in section 5, first we run linear equations 
to estimate CEOs’ pay setting. The results are shown in Table 3, in which we presented 
four wage estimation results. They are derived from a basic wage equation based on 
labor economics literature. The important variation in our model is to include an IPO 
location dummy-hdummy, which is equal to one for “H-share” in all wage equations.  
In column (1) of Table 3, following the labor economy literature, we build a basic wage 
equation by using the traditional wage determinants, such as age, education level and 
control variables (industry dummy and year dummy).  Except those human capital 
variables, a location dummy is involved. In column (1), Hdummy and Degree variables 
are statistically significant at 1% and 10% level respectively while the Age variable is 
insignificant, which indicates that location does affect wage setting in rough as the 
model is too simple.   
It is widely known that a CEO’s pay could not be only explained by his personal 
characteristics but also affected by a firm’s performance, as the CEO’s pay is linked to 
the firm’s normal operation. So in column (2), we add some performance measures to 
valuate the effect on wage in firm’s level. Still Hdummy is significant at 1% level even 
despite adding some accounting measure variables. But for the new variables, ROE and 
EPS seem to be significant and make a positive effect while ROA and Profit (Profit ratio 
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in short) are insignificant. Again the Age variable, examining the working experience 
indirectly, is insignificant as well as the Degree. 
With more extension in column (3), more characteristics of a firm have been concerned 
about, such as a firm’s belongs and its size (including the number of employees and 
sales by year). Looking into column (3), we find that Hdummy, Lnsale and EPS are 
highly significant at 1% level in affecting the CEO’s pay positively. While firms’ scale 
of employees and control by central government make a significant negative effect on 
pay setting. Still other explanatory variables do not work in determining wage except 
ROE. 
Finally, in the last column- we insert four new variables into our linear wage equation 
for CEOs, which contained a dummy variable to indicate a CEO’s political status 
(Political in short), a firm’s registered capital and some indicators to evaluate the IPO 
event (including total offer amount and cost ratio). Variables such as Lnrp, Lnoffer and 
Csale are statistically insignificant in the wage equation, where Lnrp represents the 
natural logarithm value of a firm’s registered capital, Lnoffer represents the natural 
logarithm value of a firm’s offering shares times its offer price per share through IPO 
and Csale represents the cost ratio that equaled to the actual IPO cost over annual sales. 
Those insignificant variables can then be used as instrumental variables to explain for 
location choice in Heckman two-step selectivity model. However, the variables that are 
significant in column (3) still remain the same effect on wage in column (4) 




In general, the location dummy variable is shown to be statistically significant at 1% 
level in all four columns, from which we could conclude that the effect of location 
choice on CEOs compensation does exist. Also the positive coefficient of Hdummy 
demonstrates that for a typical CEO, when other factors are controlled, entering into an 
H-share market could earn a higher wage, dominating a wage premium of “H-share” 
status. Such expected wage premium would be the motivation for CEOs to self-select 
into oversea market and therefore would induce endogeneity. If endogeneity exists, 
simple linear regression would be not appropriate to explain for the CEOs’ pay setting, 
as the location effect should be taken as the selective bias.  
Moreover, the pay of a CEO in SOEs is not market driven in China as some indicators of 
performance measurement do not work. It makes more sense to run wage equations 
separately for A-share and H-share CEOs to match the different market situations. So we 
should better use the Heckman two-stage model to modify the wage determined 
equation. 
 
6.2 HECKMAN TWO-STAGE SELECTION MODEL 
Next, we turn to our Heckman two-stage selection model.  In the model, first stage is to 
describe the determinants of the selected bias while in the second stage the selected 
observations form the wage equation under an appointed condition. Specifically, the 
Hdummy is the selective bias in our model. 
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From the conclusion made above, we keep all the explanatory variables in column (3) 
except Hdummy in the second stage to calculate the wage equation. For the selection 
stage, concerning Hdummy as the dependent variable, we use Political, Lnrp, Lnoffer 
and Csale as the instrumental variables for location choice. Although the variable 
Political appears to be significant in linear wage regression, when we put it into the 
second stage as a determinant for wage in the selection, it does not work. It is perhaps 
because of its little impact on wage. However, when we consider a location for listing, 
political connection seems to be mostly important as we discussed in the hypothesis part. 
Other variables like registered capital of the firm, the firm’s offering amount and 
experienced cost in the IPO day are also necessary to determine the location, as they are 
all insignificant in the linear wage regression. So we pick up those four variables as the 
instrumental variables. 
Table 4 and 5 describe the wage determination under H-share market and A-share 
market respectively.  
For H-share status, a CEO’s pay is positively related to a firm’s annual sales and 
profitability, that a firm’s performance could affect a CEO’s compensation level in 
certain. Also higher education level gives an advantage to gain higher pay as the 
benchmark choice (omitted) of education level is bachelor and above. The coefficients 
of SOECG and EPS are both negative which is fit for the Chinese situation that a CEO 
belongs to a central government controlled firms usually has to obey the restriction on 
pay compensation as we mentioned before. Now we turn to the first stage of the 
selection model, which shows the procedure of self-selection into a special market, and 
we find that political connection is more related to a firm’s location choice. If a typical 
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CEO were political connected, the firm would prefer listing on H-share market. Maybe it 
is attributed to the possibility that with political connection a firm could obtain the 
approval of H-share listing easier. Meanwhile compared to SOELGs, SOECG are more 
likely to list in H-share market. And the total IPO offer amount and ROE both make 
positive effect on choosing Hong Kong market, but a firm’s registered capital and ROA 
both make negative effect on the “H-share” status. Nevertheless the cost rate and a 
firm’s size (both the number of employees and the annual sales) do not affect the 
decision of location determined. Most importantly, the value of Lnsigma is significantly 
negative. This show that CEOs do self-select themselves to “H-share” status and 
selectivity does exist. This further proves our hypothesis of endogeneity. 
For A-share status, the situation is different.  In wage equation, annual sales, ROE and 
EPS all positively affect a CEO’s pay while the number of employees negatively affects 
on pay. There seems to be no influence from SOECG, maybe because that now all the 
SOEs in sample are under the mainland market environment, so the CEOs of SOEs are 
all restricted on pay, no matter whether they belong to a SOECG or belong to a SOELG. 
Then as we turn to location determined equation, it is found that the coefficient sign of 
variables, which are significant in “H-share” status, are all opposite to the sign in “H-
share” location determined equation and still significant in “A-share” status. In addition, 
the value of Lnsigma in A-share market is significant negative again, proving that 
selectivity exists. 
Deriving from the Heckman selection model in different markets, we get the predicted 
wage for each CEO, naming LnH and LnA, which represented a typical CEO’s wage in 
H-share market and the wage in A-share market respectively. Next we build a pay 
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differential for each CEO, which is defined as the differentials between the H-share 
predicted wage and the A-share predicted wage. We denote it D, which is equal to LnH 
minus LnA. 
In summary, we show the value of Lnwage, LnH, LnA and D in Table 6. It is clear to 
say that pay differentials really exist due to different market conditions. D is equal to 
1.042 on average, which shows that for a typical CEO, his wage in H-share market is 
nearly 10 times greater than his wage in A-share market equally.  
 
6.3 LOCATION DETERMINED MODEL 
Finally, in table 7, we show the Probit test of location choice.  As it is shown, the wage 
differentials, political connection, total IPO offer amount and SOECG, ROE and 
profitability are all positively related to a firm’s choice on H-share market, but ROE is 
negatively related to the H-share decision. Besides, all the control variables seem to be 
statistically significant and pointing to a direction to list aboard. However, the firm’s 
registered capital does not work on location choice, as well as if a firm belongs to the 
financial industry.  
In other words, the firms controlled by central government are much more eager to list 
aboard and the wage differentials do matter the location choice. All the effects are 





7. CONCLUSION                         
In the recent research on firm’s choice of listing location, attentions are mainly paid at 
potential considerations at  firm or  country level, which draw the conclusion that  the 
purpose of overseas listing is mainly related to raising funds through external  financing 
or the desire of promoting firm’s reputation in the global market. Such factors not be 
sufficient to explain the puzzle why many Chinese SOEs would like to choose Hong 
Kong as their IPO location even though the average P/E ratios of H-share firms is often 
significantly lower than that of A-share firms. There is hardly any literature considering 
about the potential influence of CEOs’ compensation level on location choice. This 
thesis provides an empirical investigation on whether and how a CEO’s pay would affect 
where a firm is listed using SOE firms from the Chinese mainland as our sample.  By so 
doing, we not only can better explain the puzzle mentioned above but also provides a 
different angle to consider firms’ IPO location choice.  
Our empirical analyses aim to test two main hypotheses. First, we suggest that CEO pay, 
especially for SOE, may vary across different stock markets. More specifically, other 
things being equal, there may be a wage gap between CEOs of H-share vs. A-share 
firms. In other words, a wage premium may occur in H-share market. Second, in 
response to pay differentials across different markets, CEOs are more likely to self-
select themselves into H-share market by listing their firms in there. This shows that a 
pay differential would lead to a preference to list in Hong Kong.                                                                      
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Indeed, the empirical results provide support to our claims. The wage premium actually 
existed in favor of H-share firms and as a result CEOs for SOE do tend to self-select 
themselves into H-share market. Such a finding is very plausible in the Chinese context 
in particular. CEOs of state-owned enterprises in China are often appointed by the 
government and are treated as government officials, especially for large SOEs. Hence, 
their pays are often benchmarked against certain level of government officials in China 
and hence may be significantly lower than the pay for similar CEOs in the private sector. 
By listing their firms abroad such as the Hong Kong stock market, this gives the CEOs 
an excuse to raise their pay more closely to the market level as Hong Kong follows free 
market rules and local board members and other staff hired by these SOEs listed in Hong 
Kong have to be paid at market rate. Our finding of CEO pay differentials in favor of H-
share CEOs really confirms such a conjecture. The more interesting finding then is 
whether such a pay differential influences CEOs’ listing decisions in a way that is driven 
by the private motives of these CEOs. Indeed, the finding here confirms it would induce 
CEOs’ of state-owned enterprises to seek for listing in Hong Kong. Such a finding 
provides an additional and forceful explanation to the puzzle that many SOEs in China 
would like to choose to list in Hong Kong despite the factor their shares usually 
command lower prices here.            
Our study still has the limitation as we only observe the Hong Kong stock market as the 
listing aboard location. In future, we could broaden the sample size by including other 
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Figure 1.The Yearly Quantity of IPOs in A-share Market and H-
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Figure 1. IPOs in A-share & H-share 
(1990-2011) 


















































Figure2. IPOs Scale in A-share & H-share 
(1990-2011) 




Figure 3.The Yearly Quantity of SOE’s IPOs in Percentage in A-






















































Figure 3. The Proportion of SOEs Listing Number in 
A-share Market (1990-2011) 




Figure 4.The Yearly Scale of SOE’s IPOs in Percentage in A-share 
Market (1990-2011) 
 
















































Figure 4. The proportion of SOEs Offer Amount* in 
A-share Market (1990-2011)  




Figure 5.The Yearly Quantity and Scale of SOECG’s IPOs in A-share 
Market (1990-2011) 
 



































Figure 5. Offer Amount* and Number of SOECG 
IPOs in A-share Market (1990-2011)  




Figure 6.The Yearly Quantity and Scale of SOELG’s IPOs in A-share 
Market (1990-2011) 
 





















































Figure 6. Offer Amount* and Number of SOELGs in 
A-share Market (1990-2011) 




Figure 7.The Yearly Quantity of SOE’s IPOs in Percentage in H-
















































Figure 7. The Proportion of SOEs Listing Number in H-share 
Market (1994-2011) 




Figure 8.The Yearly Scale of SOE’s IPOs in Percentage in H-share 
Market (1994-2011) 
 











































Figure 8. The Proportion of SOEs Offer Amount* in 
H-share Market (1994-2011) 




Figure 9.The Yearly Quantity and Scale of SOECG’s IPOs in H-share 
Market (1994-2011) 
 































Figure 9. Offer Amount* and Number of SOECG 
IPOs in H-share Market (1994-2011) 





Figure 10.The Yearly Quantity and Scale of SOELG’s IPOs in H-
share Market (1994-2011) 
 





































Figure 10. Offer Amount* and Number of SOELG 
IPOs in H-share Market (1994-2011) 




Figure 11-15. The CEOs Yearly Average Pay for Listed Firms 
(Figure 11 for Year 2004, Figure 12 for Year 2005, Figure 13 for Year 2006, Figure 
14 for Year 2007 and Figure 15 for Year 2008.) 


















Table 1.SOEs Cross-Listings in A-share Market and H-share Market 
    
Number of firms H>A H=A H<A* 
SOECG 4 9 14 
SOELG 3 6 23 
SOE 7 15 37 
Non-SOE 1 2 7 
Total 8 17 44 
*H represents for listing year in H-share while A is for listing 
year in A-share. 
H>A means that listed in mainland before listing in Hong Kong; 
H=A means that cross-listing occurred at the same year; 















Table 2.CEOs Average Pay in Three Groups                                                                                
Variables   A-share Market   H-share Market 
CEO's Pay 
 
Year Mean   Std. Dev. 
 
Year Mean   Std. Dev. 
 (RMB thousand) 
 
2009 521.74 588.67 
 
2009 837.31 924.05 
  
2008 471.13 595.42 
 
2008 733.48 630.41 
  
2007 437.13 534.85 
 
2007 747.81 743.20 
  
2006 289.02 278.57 
 
2006 601.24 602.40 
  
2005 250.03 243.11 
 
2005 621.40 720.19 
  
2004 137.67 44.23 
 
2004 623.83 700.28 
  
2003 110.22 42.77 
    
  
2002 92.46 58.00 
    
  
2001 78.20 66.63 
    
CEO's Pay base on 
ownership structure*        
(RMB thousand) 
 




SOELG 382.82 489.34 
  
833.32 1007.59 
CEO's Pay base on industry 
       
(RMB thousand) 
 












Ind4 757.14 969.79 
  
1474.25 277.69 
    Ind5 338.01 348.66     999.57 1048.69 
 
Ownership represents the actual controller of enterprises where SOECG stands for the SOE controlled by 
central government and SOELG stands for the SOE controlled by local government.   
*The CEO's pay base on ownership structure (mean and standard deviation) is for the whole period. 
 
Ind1-IT & Energy 
Ind2-Utilities & Health Care 
Ind3-Raw Materials & Industry 
Ind4-Financial Industry 






Table 3.The Definition of Variables 
Variables Definition 
Hdummy 
Dummy Variable, if the firm listed in H-share Market, equal to 1, 
otherwise, 0. 
Political 
Dummy Variable, if the CEO is Political Connected, equal to 1, otherwise, 
0. 
Lnrp Lnrp = Ln (the firm's registered capital) 
Lnoffer Lnoffer = Ln (the firm's offering price per share * total offering shares) 
Csale Csale = IPO Cost / the firm's annual sales 
SOECG 
Dummy Variable, if the firm is controlled by central government, equal to 
1, otherwise, 0. 
Lnsale Lnsale = Ln (the firm's annual sales) 
Lnsize Lnsize = Ln (the firm's yearly number of employees) 
ROA Return on Asset (Yearly) 
ROE Return on Equity (Yearly) 
EPS Earning per share (Yearly) 
Profit Profit = Net Profit / the firm's annual sales 
Age Age = CEO's Pay Reporting Year - CEO's Birth Year 
Age2 Age2 = Age * Age, the square of Age. 
Degree 
Dummy Variable, if the CEO obtained a bachelor degree or above, equal 
to 1, otherwise, 0. 
Year the exact number of CEO's Pay Reporting Year 
Ind1 IT & Energy Industry 
Ind2 Utilities & Health Care Industry  
Ind3 Raw Materials & Industrial Industry 
Ind4 Financial Industry 
Lnwage Lnwage = Ln (the CEO's annual pay) 
LnH LnH = Ln (the CEO's predicted annual pay in H-share Market) 
LnA LnA = Ln (the CEO's predicted annual pay in A-share Market) 








Table 4.The Empirical Results of Linear Wage Equations 
                                                                               
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Lnwage Lnwage Lnwage Lnwage 
          
Hdummy 0.552***(0.169) 0.544***(0.143) 0.505***(0.129) 0.403***(0.141) 
Political    0.182**(0.078) 
Lnrp    0.054(0.047) 
Lnoffer    0.009(0.046) 
Csale    -0.057(0.295) 
SOECG   -0.199*(0.107) -0.197*(0.110) 
Lnsale   0.290***(0.030) 0.265***(0.036) 
Lnsize   -0.119***(0.032) -0.133***(0.033) 
ROA  -0.002(0.00429) -0.0002(0.003) 8.38e-05(0.004) 
ROE  0.004***(0.002) 0.003**(0.001) 0.003**(0.001) 
EPS  0.542***(0.071) 0.363***(0.061) 0.357***(0.061) 
Profit  -0.000877(0.001) -0.000684(0.001) -0.000790(0.001) 
Age 0.00969(0.0524) -0.028(0.048) -0.042(0.047) -0.045(0.047) 
Age2 0.0001(0.001) 0.0004(0.0005) 0.0005(0.0005) 0.0005(0.0005) 
Degree 0.196*(0.101) 0.125(0.096) 0.005(0.090) -0.016(0.090) 
Year 0.176***(0.012) 0.158***(0.012) 0.133***(0.012) 0.137***(0.012) 
Ind1 0.122(0.132) 0.079(0.127) 0.125(0.122) 0.138(0.125) 
Ind2 0.077(0.121) 0.056(0.113) 0.167(0.104) 0.177*(0.105) 
Ind3 0.046(0.088) 0.003(0.082) -0.042(0.076) -0.030(0.077) 
Ind4 0.497***(0.171) 0.413***(0.150) 0.363***(0.136) 0.307**(0.149) 
Constant -342.8***(24.29) -304.1***(23.19) -258.3***(23.59) -267.4***(24.41) 
     
     Observations 2,335 2,335 2,335 2,335 
R-squared 0.136 0.237 0.313 0.319 
          







Table 5.The Result of Heckman Selection Model in H-share Market 
 
(1) (2) 





















SOECG -0.828** 0.470** 
 
(0.341) (0.239) 
Lnsale 0.417** 0.0241 
 
(0.179) (0.132) 
Lnsize -0.0102 0.0485 
 
(0.222) (0.0817) 
ROA 0.0403 -0.0324** 
 
(0.0249) (0.0137) 
ROE -0.00119 0.0127*** 
 
(0.0105) (0.00413) 
EPS -0.219** -0.00774 
 
(0.105) (0.214) 
Profit -0.00523*** 0.000915 
 
(0.00195) (0.00307) 
Age -0.204 0.310* 
 
(0.305) (0.163) 
Age2 0.00111 -0.00312** 
 
(0.00288) (0.00156) 
Degree 1.547*** 0.649 
 
(0.594) (0.413) 
Year -0.0531 0.0365 
 
(0.0660) (0.0370) 
Ind1 -0.456 1.381*** 
 
(0.648) (0.413) 
Ind2 -0.352 1.013** 
 
(0.762) (0.458) 
Ind3 -0.961 0.912*** 
 
(0.722) (0.352) 
Ind4 -0.212 -1.155 
 
(0.738) (0.801) 




 Lnsigma -0.187*(0.199) 
 Observations 124 124 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




Table 6.The Result of Heckman Selection Model in A-share Market 
  (1) (2) 





















SOECG -0.168 -0.463* 
 
(0.114) (0.238) 
Lnsale 0.289*** -0.0174 
 
(0.0310) (0.132) 
Lnsize -0.121*** -0.0436 
 
(0.0323) (0.0815) 
ROA -0.00147 0.0319** 
 
(0.00358) (0.0138) 
ROE 0.00265** -0.0123*** 
 
(0.00120) (0.00421) 
EPS 0.388*** 0.00364 
 
(0.0624) (0.215) 
Profit -0.000643 -0.000757 
 
(0.000743) (0.00316) 
Age -0.0505 -0.309* 
 
(0.0462) (0.162) 
Age2 0.000590 0.00311** 
 
(0.000448) (0.00156) 
Degree 0.000863 -0.644 
 
(0.0904) (0.413) 
Year 0.141*** -0.0358 
 
(0.0115) (0.0370) 
Ind1 0.118 -1.356*** 
 
(0.127) (0.417) 
Ind2 0.176* -0.996** 
 
(0.106) (0.459) 
Ind3 -0.0429 -0.893** 
 
(0.0768) (0.352) 
Ind4 0.349** 1.165 
 
(0.137) (0.809) 




 Lnsigma -0.171***(0.0275) 
 Observations 2,211 2,211 





Table 7.The CEO’s Predicted Wage in H-share Market and A-share 
Market 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Lnwage 2335 12.42332 1.030578 9.392662 15.79477 
LnH 2335 13.43476 1.118449 9.615799 17.07791 
LnA 2335 12.39313 0.5688072 10.39169 15.33087 

















Table 8.The Result of Probit Test 
    (1) 
Equation Variables Hdummy 
      



































   
    Observations 2,335 
  
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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